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Methodof Loan Acquisition
In contrast to the series compiled by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, which are restricted
to loans originated by the reporting lenders ("direct loans"), the Na-
tional Bureau series also covers loans acquired from. mortgage corre-
spondents ("correspondent loans"); the correspondents are generally
mortgage companies which originate loans for sale to "permanent" in-
vestors, retaining the servicing for which they receive a fee (expressed
as a per cent of the loan balance) as long as the loan is outstanding.1
In this chapter, we discuss the nature of company transactions with
correspondents, the influence of service fees on the gross yield of cor-
respondent loans, and the comparability of direct and correspondent
loans.
Relationship of Life Insurance Company to Correspondent
The correspondent is viewed as a borrower rather than as the agent of
the life insurance company in a transaction with a third party (builder
or mortgagor). From the legal standpoint, at least, the correspondent
is free to negotiate the terms on which a mortgage is to be transferred
to the company. At a result, the terms and timing of the deal between
the company and the correspondent could differ from those of the
transaction between the correspondent and the third party. It is true,
of course, that the contract rate and. other characteristics of the in-
strument will be the same, since the instrument created (or, rather,
authorized to be created) is the same in both transactions. But the
price at which the instrument is transferred need not be the same. The
finance committee records disclose the price at which the company
authorizes purchase of the mortgage from the correspondent, but not
the price at which the correspondent extends his own commitment, or
the time of that commitment.
1Fora full discussion see Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar Rise of Mortgage
Companies, Occasional Paper 60, NBER, 1959.120 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
This does not mean that the terms of a transaction between the
company and the correspondent are necessarily independent of the
terms of the transaction, covering the same instruments, between the
correspondent and mortgagor or builder. Although from the legal
standpoint the transaction between company and correspondent is a
negotiated market transaction, the actual working relationships between
them may take a variety of forms, some of which reduce their freedom
to bargain for the best terms possible under current market conditions.
To the extent that this is the case, the terms of the transaction between
the correspondent and the third party may influence the transaction be-
tween the correspondent and the company.
Several kinds of company-correspondent relationships may be dis-
tinguished in terms of the degree of independence that can be exercised
in bargaining on a specific transaction. These relationships differ from
company to company, and for any individual company they may differ
from one .correspondent to another.
First, the relationship may be one of strict independence. The com-
pany feels free to adjust its buying rate at any time without any notice,
and the correspondent is free to offer a loan to another company if he
can obtain a better price. If the correspondent extends his own com-
mitment before obtaining a commitment from the company, he does so
at his own risk, e.g., if he commits on FHA 5 per cent mortgages at a
price of 97 and the company lowers its buying price to 96 before he
obtains the company's commitment, the correspondent bears the loss.
(Of course, if prices rise in the meantime the correspondent makes a
speculative profit.) Correspondents having this kind of relationship
with life insurance companies usually deal with a number of companies,
and shift offerings from one company to another, depending on the
kinds of mortgages they have to sell and on which companies currently
have funds to invest. Companies dealing with correspondents on this
basis usually do not feel any obligation to provide them with a steady
source of funds.
Second, the relationship between company and correspondent may
be one of quasi-independence, where a continuing relationship causes
some modification in their short-run behavior. The company may give
the correspondent an allotment, permitting him to plan his operations
for some period ahead, i.e., the correspondent will be told that the
company will accept some specified volume of mortgages during a
future period (say, six months or a year). Allotments are not legally
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the company's credit requirements, and the company's buying price re-
mains subject to change without notice. Yet behavior is constrained by
concern for the relationship. If the company finds it necessary to drop
its buying price sharply at a time when a "faithful" correspondent is
heavily committed, the company may bail out the correspondent by
buying at the higher price in the correspondent's commitment. (If the
company adopts this policy, it likely will expect the "faithful" corre-
spondent to pass along any special bargains he may have acquired.) As
an alternative, the company may try to soften the impact of a price
drop by giving the correspondent short notice (say, a week) that the
drop is coming. This involves the hazard to the company that the
correspondent will try to dump all its loans on the company, including
loans that had been intended for other lenders. (Even if the company
is adamant about never bailing out a correspondent or giving notice of
a price change, it will feel constrained not to change prices too often
or too drastically.)
A third relationship between company and correspondent may be
one of virtually complete dependence. This arises when the company
grants the correspondent precommitment authority. Under such an ar-
rãngement, the correspondent is authorized to commit himself at the
company's current buying rate up to some maximum amount (e.g., 20
per cent of his annual allotment) without risk. If the company lowers
its buying rate after the correspondent extends its own commitment but
before he obtains the company's commitment, the company is obligated
to accept the loans at the terms of the correspondent's commitment. By
the same token, when the company lowers its buying rate, it expects
correspondents with commitments outstanding at a higher rate to pass
them along.2 In effect, the correspondent commits the company and
for practical purposes becomes the company's de facto agent for as
long as the relationship remains intact. Under such arrangements, the
terms of the transaction between the correspondent and the company
will always be the same as the terms of the transaction between the
correspondent and the third party. This type of relationship is most
likely to develop when the company provides the sole or largest outlet
for a given correspondent.
The implications of various types of company-correspondent rela-
tionships for the timing of statistical series on correspondent loans were
discussed in Chapter 4.
2 The company may or may not reserve the right to refuse mortgages that do
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Variability in Service Fees as an Influence
on Gross Yield
From the standpoint of mortgage-yield data, correspondent loans have
the disadvantage that the recorded yield on the credit transaction may
be affected by the terms of the servicing transaction. (The reverse, of
course, is also the case.) Saulnier has remarked that "sometimes loan
servicing is partly remunerated by a relatively high acquisition fee, and
in other cases loan acquisition is remunerated in part by a relatively
high servicing fee."3 The service fee may also be varied to compensate
for differences in contract tate. For example, a lender might pay a
service fee of 1/2 per cent on a 6.00 per cent mortgage and onlyper
cent on a 5.75 per cent mortgage that in other respects was identical.4
In such case, different gross yields would be recorded for the two
mortgages, although the return net of service fee would be the same.
This problem can be viewed from the standpoint of structural (cross-
section) analysis and time series analysis. Regarding the structural
problem, the service fee is one variable of many affecting gross yield.
Differences in service fees can affect gross yield if individual lenders
pay different service fees for different loans, or if there are interlender
differences in general policy toward service fees. The first effect is
illustrated in Table 6-1, which shows gross yield and service fees on
loans authorized by one lender in California during February 1960. Of
the 215 loans authorized in that month, 198 carried a service fee of
1/4 per cent. These loans had gross yields ranging up to 6.12 per cent,
but most were concentrated at 5.88 per cent. The remaining seventeen
loans all had a service fee of .37 per cent and gross yields of either 6.25
per cent or 6.50 per cent.
Prior to 1959, interlender variability in service fees was small. The
standard fee was 1/2 per cent, and monthly averages were generally
within the range of .47 to 51 per cent for all the companies.5 In 1959,
one company dropped its standard service fee to .375 per cent. By in-
Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies, p. 61.
4Suchcontract-rate differences may arise because correspondents have held
loans in inventory over a period of rate change, or because of market iniperfec-
tions at the origination level.
VA loans, however, occasionally carried lowerservicefees when the
maximum contract rate was far below the market.METHOD OF LOAN ACQUISITION 123
TABLE 6-1
Gross Effective Yield and Service Fee on Conventional Mortgages












creasing intercompany variabilityinservicefees,this may have
increased structural variability in gross yield.°
Time series of gross yields could be affected by service fees to the
extent that average fees change for individual companies, or shifts occur
in the mix as between companies with different average fees. Neither
effect could have been of any quantitative importance for United States
averages on FHA and conventional loans during the period 1951—58,
since the monthly averages for all companies hugged the standard fee
of 1/2percent very closely (Chart 6-1). When average service fees fell
to a lower level in 1959, month-to-month variability became somewhat
greater, as shifts in the mix had a greater effect on the average. The
variability was not systematic, however, and cyclical patterns in gross
yield were not significantly affected.7
The influence of service fees on yield can be avoided, of course,
simply by measuring yield net of service fee. Correspondent loans
cannot, however, be compared to or combined with direct loans on a
net basis because data are not available on servicing costs of direct
loans. Correspondent and direct loans can be combined only on a gross
yield basis. This raises a question regarding the comparability of gross
yields on correspondent and direct loans.
6Any increase would have been small, however, since our data do not show
a rise in over-all gross yield dispersion after 1959.
It is possible, however, that the average level of gross yield on correspondent
loans was .10 to .15 per cent lower after 1959 than it would have been if service
fees had not fallen.124 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
CHART 6-1
AVERAGE SERVICE FEES ON CORRESPONDENT LOANS,
1951—63
Percent
195t 52 '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59
Comparability
'60 '61 '62 '63
of Gross Yield on Correspondent
and Direct Loans
On direct loans, the costs of servicing are borne by the life insurance
company, while on correspondent loans, these costs are borne by the
mortgage company. There is evidence to suggest that service fees paid
to correspondents are higher than servicing costs of large companies
that do their own servicing. Hence, we might expect competition to,
force gross yields on correspondent loans below those on direct loans,
so as to equalize yields net of service costs. As an example assume that
(1) the cost of servicing mortgages (including profits adequate to
provide a competitive return on capital) is 1/4percent but the service
fee is set at % per cent by convention, and (2) direct and correspond-
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such case, we might expect price competition to bring about results
such as the following:
DirectCorrespondent
Loan Loan
Contract rate 6.00 6.00
Less: servicing costs .25 .50
Equals: contract rate net of servicing 5.75 5.50
Plus: fee required to equalize yield .25
Equals: yield net of servicing 5.75 5.75
Gross yield (contract rate plus fees) 6.00 6.25
The gross yield would be larger on correspondent loans by the amount
of the "surplus" in the service fee.
On the other hand, net costs of origination are borne by the life
insurance company on direct loans, whereas on correspondent loans
these costs are borne by the mortgage company.8 If origination costs
•(expressed as an annual rate) were exactly equal to the "surplus" in the
service fee, competition would tend to equalize gross yields on direct
and correspondent loans, as in the following example.
DirectCorrespondent
Loan Loan
Contract rate 6.00 6.00
Less: servicing costs .25 .50
net cost of origination .25
Equals: contract rate net of servicing.
and origination 5.50 5.50
Plus: fee required to equalize yield
Equals: yield net of servicing and
origination . 5.50 5.50
Gross yield (contract rate plus fees) 6.00 6.00
The upshot is that although gross yields on direct and correspondent
loans are not strictly comparable, the elements of noncomparability
8Originatingloans also generates income, but apparently most mortgage
companies do it at a net loss. See Oliver H. Jones, "Mortgage Banking in 1963,"
The Mortgage Banker, December 1964, p. 23.126 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
tend to be offsetting. If the net cost of origination is larger (smaller)
thanthesurplus in service fees paid to correspondents, the gross, yield
of correspondent loans is biased downward (upward) relative to the
gross yield on direct loans.
Gross yields on direct and correspondent loans may also differ be-
cause of market imperfections, even if the surplus in the service fee
were entirely offset by net origination costs. For the same reason, inter-
company differences exist in the net yield on correspondent loans alone.
This suggests the following pragmatic test of the appropriateness of
combining gross yields on direct and correspondent loans. Such con-
solidation is appropriate if yield differences between correspondent
CHART 6-2
INTERCOMPANY DIFFERENCES IN NET YIELD ON COR-
RESPONDENT LOANS COMPARED TO DIFFERENCES IN
GROSS YIELD BETWEEN DIRECT AND CORRESPONDENT
LOANS, QUARTERLY, 1951-63METHOD OF LOAN ACQUISITION 127
and direct loans are no greater than intercompany yield differences on
correspondent loans alone.9
This turns out indeed to be the case, as illustrated in Chart 6-2. The
upper part of the chart shows differences in net yield on correspondent
loans between two companies, while the bottom part shows differences
in gross yield between correspondent and direct loans. The differences
are calculated quarterly to minimize the effect of sampling error, which
on this basis is only slightly larger in the individual company com-
parisons. It is clear that for both FHA and conventional loans, differ-
ences in gross yield between direct and correspondent loans are of the
same general order of magnitude or, perhaps, somewhat smaller than
differences in net yield on correspondent loans between individual
companies. This pragmatic test shows no reason why direct and cor-
respondent loans should not be combined.
The direct-loan sample is not large enough to permit intercompany com-
parisons on direct loans.